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For many public lawyers in the UK, ‘political constitutionalism’1 is associated with 
the political left. Of course, few claim that there is a necessary and inevitable 
association. After all, not everyone on the left subscribes to the theory of political 
constitutionalism and nor do all of that theory’s adherents align to the left of the 
ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, a special affinity is commonly assumed to exist 
between the two.2 At one level, this is perhaps unsurprising, since there are clear 
connections between political constitutionalism and the left within both the academic 
and policy realms. Within the academic realm, many prominent political 
constitutionalists have been situated on the left—including John Griffith, Keith Ewing 
and Richard Bellamy. Within the policy realm, the Labour Party’s constitutional 
programme for most of the twentieth century found strong echoes within political 
constitutionalist thought, insofar as its confidence in a legally unlimited legislature to 
secure social and economic gains for the working classes was married with a deep-
seated and longstanding scepticism of judicial power in general and justiciable bills 
of rights in particular.3 At another level, however, this assumed special affinity with 
the left obscures the theory’s appeal to and connections with the right. In this essay I 
aim to remedy this by tracing the broad contours of a conservative tradition of political 
constitutionalism associated with the right in the UK before explaining how this 
association casts light on certain currents in contemporary public law.   
 
For these purposes I take political constitutionalism to be, in very rudimentary terms, 
a theory that suggests that a constitution privileging legislative supremacy, responsible 
                                                        
* Professor of Public Law, University of Sheffield. For comments on a previous draft, I thank the participants at 
a workshop held at the University of Sheffield (September 2017) and participants at a seminar held at the 
University of Oxford under the auspices of the Programme for the Foundations of Law and Constitutional 
Government (April 2018). I am also very grateful to Robert Craig and Chris McCorkindale for sharing their 
comments as well. Email: g.gee@sheffield.ac.uk.  
1 For the classic and foundational statement of political constitutionalist thought, see JAG Griffith, ‘The Political 
Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1.  
2 See e.g. Richard Bellamy, ‘The Limits of Lord Sumption: Limited Legal Constitutionalism and the Political 
Form of the ECHR’ in NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of the 
Law (Hart 2016) 193, 194-195. 
3 See generally Peter Dorey, The Labour Party and the Constitutional Reform: A History of Constitutional 
Conservatism (Palgrave 2008); and Mark Evans, Constitution-Making and the Labour Party (Palgrave 2003). 
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government and mechanisms of political accountability is capable of channeling the 
exercise of political power towards the common good.4 This theory posits that, over 
the long haul, a system of constitutional self-government reliant primarily on political 
processes to check political power can, in the right conditions, secure constitutional 
goods—such as political equality, the rule of law and human rights. Courts, under this 
theory, perform an important function by resolving disputes impartially and according 
to law—but, conceived in this way, that function is narrow, eschewing judicial review 
of legislation, with review of executive action limited to grounds that avoid the 
second-guessing of policy choices.5 Much of the scholarship expounding this theory 
thus tends to combine robust defences of legislative politics with uncompromising, 
and at times relentless, critiques of judicial review. This theory has been especially 
influential in the UK as a way of making sense of the customary constitution, albeit 
some criticize it for lacking descriptive accuracy (i.e. it no longer expresses the main 
characteristics of the changing constitution),6 normative appeal (i.e. it does not furnish 
an attractive vision of a ‘good’ constitution),7 and analytic utility (i.e. it distorts how 
law, politics and constitutions are understood, not least by encouraging polarized 
views about how best to allocate authority between courts and legislatures).8 
Nevertheless, today, many public lawyers craft analyses in terms of and by reference 
to this theory, and even amongst many of those who do not subscribe to its claims, 
there is broad recognition that this theory expresses something significant about how 
many in the UK conceive of the very idea of a constitution.9  
 
                                                        
4 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart 2003); and Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A 
Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 2007). 
5 This conception of the judicial role is outlined in Richard Ekins and Graham Gee, ‘Putting Judicial Power in its 
Place’ (2017) 36 University of Queensland Law Journal 375, 375-378. 
6 See e.g. Tom R Hickman, ‘In Defence of the Legal Constitution’ (2006) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 
981. 
7 See e.g. Sir John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] Public Law 72; and Sir John Law, ‘The Constitution: 
Morals and Rights’ [1996] Public Law 622. 
8 See TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law (OUP 2013) 57; Jeff King, 
‘Rights and the Rule of Law in Third Way Constitutionalism’ (2015) 30 Constitutional Commentary 101l; and 
Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Recasting the Political Constitution: From Rivals to Relationships’ (2019) 28 King’s Law 
Journal ___. C.f. Graham Gee and Grégoire CN Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 273. 
9 See e.g. Andrew Le Sueur, Maurice Sunkin and Jo Eric Murkins, Public Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Oxford: OUP, 3nd edn 2016); Roger Masterman and Colin Murray, Exploring Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (Harlow: Pearson, 2013) and Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law (OUP, 3rd edn 2017).  
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Of late political constitutionalist scholarship has taken a ‘reflexive’10 turn, with a focus 
less on contesting the expansion of judicial power and the rise of rights adjudication, 
and more on identifying the political conditions and social forces most conducive to 
the development and maintenance of the sort of constitutional order associated with 
political constitutionalism.11 This is a welcome development that will help us to better 
understand what a political constitution presupposes about, amongst other things, the 
political culture and the ideas and movements that help to shape it. Noticeably absent 
to date from the reflexive turn, however, is an exploration of the possible relationships 
between political constitutionalism, political ideology, and the left and the right. This 
is regrettable, not least since one explanation for the relative popularity of political 
constitutionalism in the UK is its cross-ideological appeal to large sections of both the 
left and the right. To be sure, not only are ‘left’ and ‘right’ notoriously slippery terms 
with various social and economic implications, but there are other dimensions to keep 
in mind when striving to ascertain patterns of support for this or that constitutional 
theory. Other dynamics increasingly cut across both the left and the right,12 perhaps 
most obviously support for and identification with ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’.13 Yet, the 
ideological patterns captured in the distinction between left and right remain relevant 
when thinking about the conditions that help or hinder the development of different 
types of constitutional orders.  
 
My premise, then, is that the ideological dimensions to political constitutionalism have 
been largely neglected, with this theory’s connections with and appeal to both the left 
and the right remaining underexplored within public law scholarship. I begin in Part 
II by reflecting on the relative neglect of these ideological dimensions. In Part III, I 
explore one set of those dimensions by charting the broad contours of a conservative 
tradition of political constitutionalism that reflects the dominant constitutional vision 
on the political right in the UK for much of the last century. The term ‘political right’ 
embraces a number of ideological tendencies of course, notably conservatism and neo-
                                                        
10 See Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘Three Waves of Political Constitutionalism’ (2019) 28 
King’s Law Journal __; and Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘Political Constitutionalism’ (2019) 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (forthcoming). 
11 For the critique that writing on political constitutionalism has tended to be conducted ‘in something close to a 
sociological vacuum’ with very limited discussion of the underlying material forces that drive its rise or fall, see 
Chris Thornhill, ‘The Mutation of International Law in Contemporary Constitutions: Thinking Sociologically 
about Political Constitutionalism’ (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 207, 212-213. 
12 See generally Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Polity, 1994). 
13 See John Curtice, The Emotional Legacy of Brexit: How Britain Has Become a Country of ‘Remainers’ and 
‘Leavers’ (The UK in a Changing Europe, 2018); and Paula Surridge, ‘The Left – Right Divide’ in Anand 
Menon (ed), Brexit and Public Opinion 2019 (The UK in a Changing Europe, 2019) 6. Both accessible at 
http://ukandeu.ac.uk.  
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liberalism. Conservatism, as I see it, expresses themes at the heart of the constitutional 
thought of the political right in the UK over the last century; themes which have also 
buttressed political constitutionalism in the UK, or at least so I argue in this essay. My 
argument is that for most of the last century this conservative tradition of political 
constitutionalism coexisted with a social democratic variant, with this reflecting and 
reinforcing a broad-based ideological consensus for and acceptance of the historically 
political character of the UK’s constitution. In this, I view political constitutionalism 
as straddling multiple ideological traditions. By decoupling these traditions, my aim 
is to challenge the assumption that some special affinity exists between this theory, 
social democracy and the political left. Interrogating the conservative tradition of 
political constitutionalism can helps us to grasp some reasons why this vision of 
constitutional government has appealed to the right as well as the left. It also renders 
explicit several ambiguities within political constitutionalist thought relating to, 
amongst other things, strong government, elite leadership and democratic will. In Part 
IV, I point to lessons that can be discerned from the conservative tradition of political 
constitutionalism. No tradition is ever static, and in Part V I argue that the conservative 
tradition has been changing in several important ways. In its changed guise the 
conservative tradition now enjoys heightened prominence in both the policy and the 
academic domains, and I consider some of the reasons for and consequences of this. 
In Part VI, I return to the larger patterns of ideological support for a political 
constitution, arguing that this support is beginning to bifurcate between this changed 
conservative tradition on the one hand and a more radical interpretation emerging on 
the left on the other. I close by reflecting on the future of political constitutionalism 
in light of its possible bifurcation along these ideological lines. 
 
II. POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
 
My starting suggestion is that the ideological dimensions to political constitutionalism 
have been neglected within public law thought, at least for the most part. There are of 
course many possible ideological dimensions to political constitutionalism (or, indeed, 
any other constitutional theory for that matter). These include: the role that ideologies 
have played in the historical development of political constitutionalism; the degree to 
which this theory is the site of ideological competition; the extent to which the theory 
has been subject to ideological critique; the degree to which the theory is compatible 
with different ideologies; and the extent to which the theory itself operates as, or in 
ways akin to, an ideology. Public law scholarship in the UK has more or less neglected 
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each of these dimensions.14 For these purposes, my particular interest lies in the failure 
of public lawyers to investigate the full range of ideological traditions within which 
the core claims, values and assumptions of political constitutionalism are embedded. 
This is so even although (or perhaps because) many assume that some special affinity 
exists with the left, and with social democracy in particular. Indeed, it sometimes 
seems as if many public lawyers regard political constitutionalism as embedded within 
a single social democratic tradition, rather than as encompassing a number of 
distinct—albeit overlapping—ideological traditions, including but not limited to social 
democracy. 
 
The term ‘social democracy’ has no settled meaning of course, but typically includes 
commitments to: social justice and substantive equality; the democratic state, as a way 
of promoting social welfare and economic change; and the extension of democratic 
values to the social and economic spheres as well as the political sphere.15 As I see it, 
public lawyers have made little attempt to explore a possible affinity between political 
constitutionalism in light of and by reference to these commonplace social democratic 
commitments. There has been little discussion of whether such commitments shape a 
more or less distinct social democratic account of political constitutionalism. Largely 
absent from the literature on political constitutionalism are accounts drawing careful 
connections with social democracy’s traditional commitment to parliamentarianism, 
its broad acceptance of the neutrality of the state within the Fabian tradition, and the 
tendency towards anti-intellectualism and empiricism of the trade union movement in 
large parts of the twentieth century.16 Equally striking is the absence of much debate 
about whether any special affinity has differed over time in line with the ebb and flow 
of different concerns of social democrats; for example, it is possible that any special 
affinity with political constitutionalism might have changed as the left’s embrace of 
the nation state has waned and its embrace of supranational regimes has 
strengthened.17  
                                                        
14 Alison Young refers to ‘the ideology of political constitutionalism’, but regrettably does not elaborate upon 
this choice of characterization. Of course, the term ‘ideology’ is itself subject to competing definitions, some 
carrying negative connotations (e.g. ideology as false ideas that legitimate dominant power structures). 
Implicitly, Young appeals to an understanding of ideology that implies that political constitutionalism encourages 
false ideas about the constitution, law and politics; see, for example, the suggestion that it is hard to view 
political constitutionalism ‘as anything other than a form of myth or ideology, or an account of fictional groups 
that do not really exist’: Alison L. Young, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (OUP, 2017) 83. 
15 For a recent discussion in a constitutional context, see KD Ewing, ‘Jeremy Corbyn and the Law of 
Democracy’ (2018) 28 King’s Law Journal 343. 
16 See generally Dorey (n3) 347-379. 
17 See Danny Nicol, ‘The Left, Capitalism and Judicial Power’ in Richard Ekins and Graham Gee (eds), Judicial 
Power and the Left: Notes on a Sceptical Tradition (Policy Exchange 2017) 26. 
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In other words, the tendency has been for public lawyers to assume that some special 
affinity with social democracy and the political left exists, rather than to interrogate 
its (possibly changing) nature, limits and implications. Many public lawyers seem 
content to treat Griffith’s 1978 Chorley Lecture on ‘The Political Constitution’ as 
sufficient evidence that political constitutionalism is best understood as a social 
democratic outgrowth of the ‘functionalist style in public law’.18 It is true that 
Griffith’s work exemplified the functionalist method, which was itself defined by a 
practical reformist agenda that used both law and policy in ways ‘directly tied’ to the 
political movement described under labels such as ‘new liberalism, social democracy, 
progressivism, or democratic socialism’.19 But the status of this lecture as ‘a founding 
text’20 of political constitutionalism is questioned,21 with Martin Loughlin arguing that 
Griffith’s lecture cannot be divorced from its functionalist context and repackaged as 
the beginning of ‘political constitutionalism’, at least not without distorting Griffith’s 
motivations and methods.22 I return to Loughlin’s critique of some readings of 
Griffith’s lecture later. The key point to note, for now, is that any affinity between 
political constitutionalism, social democracy and the left remains underexplored.  
 
Almost wholly absent over most of the forty years since Griffith’s lecture has been 
any sustained investigation of possible connections between political constitutionalism 
and the right. It is true that in the last five years or so some have begun (rather 
tentatively) to question whether political constitutionalism is ‘somehow the property 
of the left’,23 and as part of this to reappraise the theory’s relationship with the right. 
There are four main threads to this reappraisal. First, some have noted that political 
                                                        
18 On Griffith’s place within the functionalist style, see Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory 
(Clarendon 1992) 197-201; and Martin Loughlin, ‘John Griffith: Ave atque Vale’ [2010] Public Law 643, 645-
649. 
19 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Functionalist Style in Public Law’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 361, 
363. 
20 Thomas Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in “The Political Constitution”’ (2007) 70 Modern 
law Review 250, 250;  
21 Martin Loughlin, ‘Modernism in British Public Law, 1919-79’ [2014] Public Law 56, 66. 
22 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’ (2018) 28 King’s Law Journal ___ (arguing that later 
generations of public lawyers have misread Griffith’s lecture, which is better understood as the ‘last gasp’ of the 
functionalism and not the beginnings of a new school of political constitutionalism). For a caution against simply 
assuming that the functionalist style in public law has an uncomplicated relationship with left ideologies, see 
Martin Loughlin, ‘Reflections on The Idea of Public Law’ in Emilios Christodoulidis and Stephen Tierney (eds), 
Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism (Ashgate, 2008) 47, 53. 
23 K.D. Ewing, ‘The Resilience of the Political Constitution’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2111, 2124. 
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constitutionalism attracts adherents on the right as well as the left.24 Second, it has 
been suggested that the theory ‘tilts to the right’,25 with its principal pillars—
representative democracy, responsible government and legislative supremacy—prone 
to producing ‘conservative outcomes’,26 although this in turn poses the question of 
what exactly it might mean to talk of ‘conservatism’ in this context. Third, it has been 
further suggested that to be a political constitutionalist, and in particular to defend a 
political constitution in any real world polity, almost inevitably entails a conservative 
posture.27 Finally, it has been suggested that, in both the academic and policy realms, 
the right has sought of late to appropriate political constitutionalism from the left.28 
All of these threads are worth exploring, and I will touch on each of them in this essay, 
but for the time being these remain mere threads, with the public lawyers who offered 
these important insights tending to do so in passing and as a small part of larger 
unrelated arguments. In other words, there has still been no sustained examination of 
possible connections between political constitutionalism and the political right, and 
with notions of conservatism in particular. Important questions have therefore pass 
unasked, such as whether thinking about its appeal to the right, together with its 
possible affinity with conservatism, may generate fresh insights into the nature, 
content and future of political constitutionalism itself.   
 
The suggestion, then, is that the relationships between political constitutionalism and 
each of the left and social democracy on the one hand and the right and conservatism 
on the other hand have been largely neglected. This relative neglect of the ideological 
dimensions to political constitutionalism can be explained, in part, by two interlocking 
trends. The first is a general tendency amongst public lawyers in the UK to have very 
little to say about how political ideology and public law interact.29 True, there have 
                                                        
24 See e.g. Aileen McHarg, ‘Reforming the UK Constitution: Law, Convention, Soft Law’ (2008) 71 Modern 
Law Review 853; and Mark Hickford, ‘The Historical Political Constitution—Some Reflections on Political 
Constitutionalism in New Zealand’s History and its Possible Normative Value’ [2013] New Zealand Law 
Review 585, 588. 
25 See e.g Ewing (n23) 2127. 
26 See e.g. Marco Goldoni, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Value of Constitution-Making’ (2014) 27 Ratio 
Juris 387, 398; and McHarg (n23) 876. 
27 See e.g. Janet McLean, ‘The Unwritten Political Constitution and its Enemies’ (2016) 14 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 119, 136. This suggestion is arguably also implicit in Mac Amhlaigh’s partial defence of 
political constitutionalism: Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Putting Political Constitutionalism in its Place’ (2016) 14 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 175. 
28 See e.g. Ewing (n21); and Loughlin (n20). 
29 The relative absence of ideological analysis is not restricted to public law scholarship, but can be seen across 
much legal scholarship, with notably exceptions such as critical legal studies. See Andrew Halpin, ‘Ideology and 
Law’ (2006) 11 Journal of Political Ideologies 153. 
 8 
been influential accounts that employ historical approaches to explain how ideology 
has helped to shape the intellectual development of public law,30 but there is very little 
exploration of how ideologies map onto contemporary debates.31 The second trend 
reinforces the first: a tendency for political constitutionalists to adopt narrow accounts 
of politics.32 These accounts usually stress: certain political institutions, but not others 
(e.g. legislatures, rather than executives); some levels of government at the expense 
of others (e.g. the national, but overlooking the sub-national and the supra-national); 
and only certain sites of popular political activity (e.g. voting rather than campaigning 
and protesting). This leads to an impoverished and incomplete account of political life 
that seems to suggest that competition between parties channeled via a national 
legislature, and punctuated by periodic elections, is the only important force in politics. 
It is of course ironic that proponents of political constitutionalism tend to adopt a 
reductive understanding of politics even whilst seeking a better appreciation of all of 
the many and different ways in which political practices can regulate governmental 
power. The failure to explore the ideological dimensions to political 
constitutionalism—and, more particularly, to think about the different ideological 
traditions within which its claims, values and assumptions are embedded—is part and 
parcel of this reductive approach. The failure of public lawyers generally, and political 
constitutionalists specifically, to take ideology seriously is unfortunate, at least insofar 
as the study of public law, and political constitutionalism in particular, presupposes 
an intimate grasp of political life; and few phenomena within political life are as 
ubiquitous, persistent and pertinent as ideology.33 
 
The ideological dimensions to political constitutionalism matter, in particular, because 
some level of broad-based, deep-rooted ideological consensus across both the left and 
right seems a prerequisite for a political constitution to flourish in a real world polity. 
By ideological consensus, I mean, for these purposes, broad acceptance that traverses 
ideological traditions of the primary institutional commitments envisaged by political 
                                                        
30 Martin Loughlin’s Public Law and Political Theory is the standout example: Loughlin (n16). 
31 See D. Howarth, ‘The Politics of Public Law’ in M. Elliott and D. Feldman (eds), The Cambridge Companion 
to Public Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 37, 50. 
32 On this trend, see Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘A Note from the Editors: The State of the 
Political Constitution’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2103, 2107-2108. See also Panu Minkkinen, ‘Political 
Constitutional Theory vs Political Constitutionalism’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 585; 
and Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Politics and Constitutional Jurisgenesis: A Cautionary Note on Political Constitutionalism’ 
(2018) 7 Global Constitutionalism 75. 
33 See generally W. A. Mullins, ‘On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science’ (1972) 66 American Political 
Secience Review 498, 498. See also Zizek’s reference to ‘the unrelenting pertinence’ of ideology’: Slavoj Zizek, 
‘Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology’ in Slavoj Zizek (ed), Mapping Ideology (Verso, 1994) 1, 1. 
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constitutionalism.34 Where such a consensus exists, the governing elites from the main 
different traditions are, for the most part, not only prepared to work within a political 
constitution, but accept the need to preserve the institutional features envisaged by it. 
There can still be dissenting voices within each ideological tradition, but provided that 
most are in broad agreement a consensus can still exist. Similarly, a basic consensus 
can exist in the face of occasional cross-ideological battles on constitutional questions, 
provided that there remains a general acceptance of the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of the overarching constitutional framework. For much of the twentieth century in the 
UK, for example, there were disputes between the governing parties on constitutional 
questions, but the governing elites on both the left and the right mostly embraced the 
institutional features of political constitutionalism, and did not use electoral success 
to change the essential rules of the constitutional game.35 Of course the primary reason 
why ideological consensus is so important for a political constitution is simply stated. 
A political constitution is defined by the lack of justiciable constraints on the 
legislature, and is thus susceptible to change (at least in theory) via ordinary political 
processes whenever a new party enters government. It is substantial ideological 
consensus about its desirability that—amongst other things—enables a political 
constitution to endure through the swings and roundabouts of competitive electoral 
politics.  
 
All of this suggests that patterns of ideological support for political constitutionalism 
matter. Their importance is heightened whenever there are signs that these patterns 
might be changing; or if, more dramatically, the traditional ideological consensus may 
be breaking down. It might be an exaggeration (or at least: premature) to speak of a 
breakdown in ideological consensus in the UK—but there are signs of change. There 
seems to be contrasting constitutional dynamics within the left and the right. Of note 
is the waning judicial scepticism on the left, with many politicians and lawyers on the 
left seeming to feel that stricter legal controls are required to constrain governmental 
powers, with it also now necessary to empower courts to safeguard individuals from 
the perceived ideological excesses of the right.36 At the same time, there seems to be 
growing and deepening concern amongst sections of the political and legal right about 
                                                        
34 On definitions of consensus, see Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Consensus Politics from Attlee to 
Thatcher (Wiley-Blackwell 1989). Cf Ben Pimlott, ‘Is the “Postwar Consensus” a Myth?’ (1989) 2 
Contemporary Record 12. 
35 See Vernon Bogdanor, Politics and the Constitution: Essays on British Government (Dartmouth, 1994) 3-20. 
36 For a range of different views on changes in the left’s traditional scepticism towards the courts, see Richard 
Ekins and Graham Gee (eds), Judicial Power and the Left: Notes on a Sceptical Tradition (Policy Exchange 
2017) 
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judicial expansionism, a concern directed at supranational courts in particular, but 
ensnaring domestic judicial review as well. Moreover, amongst sizable sections of the 
left, there seems to be declining confidence in the UK Parliament’s ability to serve as 
an effective check on government at the same time as some on the right seem 
unconcerned about the potential for the massive enlargement of executive power at 
Parliament’s expense in the event of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Changing 
patterns are not necessarily fixed of course, but the current unsettled nature of the 
constitution suggests that such changes deserve scrutiny. Whether long-lasting or not, 
such changes point to the need to better understand the reasons for and durability of 
the appeal of political constitutionalism to each of the left and the right.  
 
III. A CONSERVATIVE TRADITION OF POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
It is against this background that I want to outline a conservative tradition of political 
constitutionalism that reflects the dominant constitutional vision on the political right 
in the UK over the last century. It is by design that I speak of a conservative ‘tradition’ 
of political constitutionalism, which I understand as ‘customary beliefs, practices, and 
actions that [have] endured from the past to present and attracted the allegiance of 
people so that they wish to perpetuate it’37 and, in this way, is a ‘collaborative, multi-
generational enterprise’.38 The set of beliefs, practices and actions that comprise the 
conservative tradition of political constitutionalism are to be found, for the most part, 
not in academic works, but rather in the writings of politicians on the right during the 
first part of the twentieth century, such as Conservative MPs Hugh Cecil, Quintin 
Hogg and Leo Amery. There is no explicit, comprehensive or authoritative statement 
of this tradition. Its beliefs, practices and actions are traceable instead to a ‘hinterland 
of rhetoric, values and received ideas’39 which have shaped constitutional thinking on 
the political right (and within the Conservative Party in particular) over the last 
century, with the good sense assumed to be embodied in these received ideas usually 
possessing a tacit and taken-for-granted status, until recently at least. Participants in 
this tradition have exhibited a confidence in and allegiance to the basic institutional 
commitments of political constitutionalism, and have sought to operate within them, 
and also to preserve them. The conservative tradition of political constitutionalism, in 
other words, envisages a constitutional order based around legislative supremacy and 
responsible government, where political power is checked primarily through political 
                                                        
37 John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism (Cornell University Press, 1998) 38. 
38 Samuel Scheffler, Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory (OUP, 2012) 291. 
39 EHH Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (OUP, 2008) 3. 
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processes, and where the legislature is ultimately responsible for the justice of the law, 
with courts contributing to the rule of law by resolving disputes impartially, and by 
keeping faith with past legal commitments.  
 
All of this is familiar to orthodox accounts of political constitutionalism. At the same 
time, the conservative tradition is distinctively ‘conservative’, inasmuch as it is 
primary features are underpinned by four core conservative themes: intellectual 
imperfection, scepticism, traditionalism, and organicism.40 These themes relate to how 
conservatives view human nature, human reasoning, political knowledge and political 
organization. At the very root of the conservative creed is the belief that human 
reasoning is limited in its ability to comprehend all of the complexities of social 
practices, with abstract reasoning in particular an unreliable guide for making sense 
of and assessing existing arrangements (intellectual imperfection).41 Political wisdom, 
on this account, is to be found not in abstract reasoning or theories, but rather in the 
accumulated experience of the polity as a whole (scepticism). The knowledge required 
for successful political action accrues over multiple generations, and resides in the 
concrete traditions of behaviour and institutions that express the consolidated wisdom 
of the polity.42 This encourages, in turn, an attachment to established practices, 
institutions and ways of doing things that have contributed to the common good over 
time together with an associated resistance to precipitate and far-reaching change 
(traditionalism). Of special importance for conservatives is that long-standing 
institutions and practices often embody wisdom, and furnish structure, stability, 
continuity, and (in the best of cases) unity in ways that are seldom fully understood. 
This leads to scepticism of reforms that seek to overhaul existing arrangements: the 
knowledge expressed in long-standing ways of doing things and settled institutions 
has accumulated over multiple generations, whereas reform efforts tend to be the 
product of only a single generation at most. Ultimately, for conservatives, a political 
community is not an experiment for a social engineer, but rather a complex whole that 
is comprised of individuals whose relationships with each other—in the best of cases—
are facilitated by shared histories and cultures themselves not the product of planning 
(organicism). 
                                                        
40 These four principles recur throughout conservative political thought. See e.g. Anthony Quinton, The Politics 
of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to 
Oakeshott (Faber, 1978). 
41 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’ in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (rev edn, Liberty 
Fund 1991) 5. The relevance of conservative themes for thinking about change in the context of constitutional 
flux is discussed in Graham Gee and Grégoire CN Webber, ‘A Conservative Disposition and Constitutional 
Change’ (2020) 40 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming).  
42 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France  [1790] (Penguin 2004). 
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These core conservative themes mould a more or less distinctive tradition of political 
constitutionalism, which has four key characteristics. First, strong government is at its 
very heart. That legislative supremacy, when combined with high degrees of 
centralization, tends to enable strong, decisive and efficient government in the national 
interest goes some way to explaining the appeal to the political right of political 
constitutionalism. As Leo Amery put it, ‘[t]he spirit of strong and stable 
government…is of the essence’43 for the political right, where government is ‘always 
the starting point and mainspring of action’.44 Strong government, according to 
conservatives, is necessary to foster the settled and peaceful conditions that furnish 
the space for individual citizens to pursue their own conceptions of the good life. For 
most conservatives, some level of authority is always necessary within a political 
community to secure some measure of individual freedom. But it is a notion of strong 
but limited government that animates conservative political thought: the function of 
strong government is not to pursue some overarching plan, where the state imposes 
ultimate purposes on its citizens, but involves securing instead the conditions that 
facilitate citizens and their intermediate associations (e.g. families, churches and 
companies) in the pursuit of their own ends, undertakings and goals.45 Government 
should therefore be strong but limited, in the sense of confined to paradigmatically 
governing activities: namely, ‘the provision and custody of general rules of conduct’46 
that help to maintain peace, justice, property and liberty. Limited government is 
favoured both because it promotes individual self-reliance, and also in recognition of 
the limits on the reach of human reasoning, and hence the limits on the wisdom of 
any one set of governing elites.  
 
This notion of strong, limited government is intertwined with political leadership in 
the national interest, with a stress on the statecraft required to govern for the common 
good through established ways of doing things, including knowing how far elastic 
tacit rules can be stretched without breaking. Quoting Amery once more, it is the 
government that has ‘the responsibility of leading and directing Parliament and the 
nation with its judgement and convictions’.47 There are checks on government power 
                                                        
43 LS Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP, 1947) 18. 
44 Amery (n43) 15. 
45 In Oakeshott’s terms: civil association, rather than an enterprise association. See Michael Oakeshott, On 
Human Conduct (Clarendon, 1975). 
46 Michael Oakeshott ‘On Being Conservative’ in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (rev edn, Liberty 
Fund 1991) 407, 424. 
47 Amery (n43) 31. 
 13 
within this constitutional order—but not so many as to prevent the government from 
performing its main tasks.48 Much is entrusted to the legislature of course, including 
its exposure to electoral competition, as the discipline to ensure that governmental 
power is not misused, or that misuses are quickly corrected. The government is 
answerable in the courts for legal wrongs; this is a vital complement to parliamentary 
accountability. But, under this tradition, judicial review of government action is 
limited to specified kinds of grounds only, does not extend to every domain of 
government action and largely aims to avoid questioning the merits of policy choices.  
 
Second, part of the appeal of political constitutionalism, on this conservative tradition, 
lies in its combination of strong government with a limited notion of representation,49 
which acknowledges the vital importance of democratic will, but without fetishizing 
it. (The political constitution involves, in Amery’s aphorism, ‘government of the 
people, for the people, but not by the people’50). Representation is limited in the sense 
that it combines political equality and mass participation at one stage (elections), 
before then separating policy deliberation by elites at an earlier stage (preparing a 
manifesto) and a later stage (designing and implementing policy inside government). 
Voters have very real influence in choosing the identity of the governing elites—but 
their participation is minimized as well as routinized through elections.51 In reality, a 
mass electorate can only participate infrequently, and can only cope with fairly 
uncomplicated choices, and therefore electoral competition tends to reduce to a choice 
between a handful of major national parties, with governments ultimately answerable 
to the voters who put them in office. Hence, voter participation is centred around 
government formation, not policy formation. This in turn gives the governing parties 
scope to monopolize the policy agenda, with national political leaders enjoying 
significant room to act as they see fit, including departing from popular will where 
they decide that doing so is in the national interest. This approach to representation, 
laced as it is with ‘a scepticism as to unbridled democracy’,52 coheres with 
conservative accounts of the political knowledge that should guide political action. On 
those accounts, political knowledge is found in the accumulated experience of the 
polity, which is a product of multiple generations, not just a single generation of 
                                                        
48 See generally Quintin Hogg, The Case for Conservatism (Penguin, 1947). 
49 See Matthew Hall, David Marsh and Emma Vines, ‘A Changing Democracy: Contemporary Challenges to the 
British Political Tradition’ (2018) 39 Policy Studies 365, 367. 
50 Amery (n43) 20-21. 
51 See Paul Hirst, Representative Democracy and Its Limits (Polity, 1990). 
52 This draws on Norton’s excellent account: Philip Norton, ‘Speaking for the People: A Conservative Narrative 
of Democracy’ (2012) 33 Policy Studies 121, 121. Cf Anthony Wright, Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on 
British Politics (Routlege,1993) 64-65. 
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contemporary voters. Conservatives accept that weight should be given to the popular 
will of the current generation, but that this must at the same time be seen as transient. 
Good government, in particular, requires awareness of the past, and an acceptance that 
there are tried and tested ways in which governing has developed over time.53 This 
implies that there should be politically specified limits on the democratic will. This 
reinforces the importance of strong government, where the governing elite can resolve 
to depart from the popular will where the best interests of the nation require it. Of 
course no government will do so lightly or frequently, since any governing party 
deemed unresponsive is likely to be removed from office at the next election.  
 
Third, a confidence in the capacity of a healthy political culture to secure competent, 
responsible self-government, in line with the rule of law and in ways that secure rights, 
is a hallmark of the conservative tradition of political constitutionalism. This political 
culture rests on and is a product of an intelligent scheme of government (legislation, 
administration and adjudication) that has developed over time. The knowledge that is 
required to manage human affairs in ways that secures the common good, including 
by fostering a culture of rights, is not found in abstract statements of constitutional 
principles or in bills of rights, and the technocratic and scholastic approach that such 
instruments encourage.54 Rather, political knowledge resides in the customary ways 
of conduct, historically accumulated experience and the institutions that help to shape 
a whole political culture. Conservatives stress, in particular, the role of institutions 
within that culture. Institutions not only supply structure and continuity. In a healthy 
polity, institutions, which have become known and understood by a community over 
generations, transcend social and political divisions, and in this help to promote order, 
stability and liberty. The common law, and the courts in their traditional secondary 
role on the constitutional stage, are both important institutions for conservatives, each 
worthy of reverence in helping to forge a political culture that generates more rights, 
prosperity, stability and legal certainty than most. However, the role of the courts is 
circumscribed, with judges contributing to the vital political project of ordering social 
life over time by resolving legal disputes in accordance with publicly promulgated 
standards, a project that judges jeopardize if they seek to remake those standards when 
adjudicating.  
 
                                                        
53 Norton (n52) 121-124. 
54 But of course note the important role of some Conservative Party politicians in the conception of the ECHR: 
Marco Duranti, The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics and the 
Origins of the European Convention (OUP, 2017). 
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Fourth, the conservative tradition of political constitutionalism unashamedly envisages 
an elite-led and executive-oriented constitutional order, where ministers are entrusted 
with considerable political and legal power, subject above all to robust parliamentary 
scrutiny. Political leadership and statecraft are central elements of this tradition,55 with 
the activity of governing assumed to require particular skills;56 or, as Oakeshott put it, 
a particular ‘political education’ in the established modes of government behaviour.57 
Trust in government ‘is created and sustained by appropriate behaviour on the part of 
officeholders’, where political elites are ‘conscious of their obligations towards 
society’, and behave in ways that ‘generate the habits and prescriptions on which 
constitutional norms rest’.58 In a political constitution defined by the lack of judicially 
enforceable limits on the legislature, and with weak-form judicial review, there is a 
particular need for political leadership to navigate skillfully the constraints on 
governmental power, and more especially to exhibit prudence when exercising that 
power given the relative lack of legal constraints. Ministers must govern within the 
frame of settled law, taking care to exercise their powers lawfully, and to direct the 
state’s personnel and resources wisely. In this context, statecraft is required to 
ascertain how to pursue change within the established ways of doing things. 
Politicians, after all, are ‘heirs before they are choosers’,59 with much governing 
activity devoted to addressing the consequences of inherited policies that would not 
necessarily have been chosen by the government-of-the-day. This requires prudent 
political leadership to work out how policy inheritance conditions future policy 
change. It also requires, on this view, recognition of the ways in which settled 
arrangements can provide structure, continuity and, in the best of cases, unity and 
allegiance.60 It further requires skilful leadership to determine when it might be 
necessary to depart from the popular will in service of the national interest and, in 
this, to reconcile what Andrew Gamble has termed ‘the politics of power’ (the 
statecraft required to govern within social and economic forces not of a government’s 
                                                        
55 On the importance of leadership, both within conservative political thought and the political practice of the 
Conservative Party, see John Ramsden, ‘Political Parties: Conservative Political and Constitutional Ideology’ in 
Robert Blackburn (ed), Constitutional Studies: Contemporary Issues and Controversies (Mansell, 1992) 79, 83.  
56 Norton (n52) 126. See also Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (Williams & Norgate, 1913) 232. 
57 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’ in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (rev edn, Liberty Fund 
1991) 43. 
58 Nevill Johnson, ‘Constitutional Reform: Some Dilemmas for a Conservative Philosoph’ in Zig Layton-Henry 
(ed), Conservative Party Politics (MacMillan, 1980) 127, 131. 
59 Richard Rose, ‘Inheritance Before Choice in Public Policy’ (1990) 2 J Theoretical Politics 263, 263.  
60 Philip Norton, ‘The Constitution’ in Kevin Hickson (ed), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party 
Since 1945 (Palgrave, 2005) 93, 93-94. 
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own making) with the ‘politics of support’ (the basic electoral imperative of crafting 
a programme for government that will attract and retain popular support).61  
 
These four characteristics, as I see it, underpin and inform a conservative tradition of 
political constitutionalism. There are differences in emphasis from the more familiar 
interpretations of political constitutionalism found in the literature. There is much less 
explicit emphasis on the potential for disagreement about questions of law, justice, 
rights and the constitution itself, but this seems implicit in (or at least not far removed 
from) the conservative attachment to political skepticism. A different lexicon animates 
the conservative tradition. It does not speak in highfalutin terms of political equality, 
but it shares the familiar political constitutionalist commitment to framing institutional 
arrangements in a representative democracy around majority rule. In this, it embraces 
the basic notion of equal respect that is at the root of democratic constitutions defined 
by electoral competition. It prioritizes the mechanisms of political accountability, and 
envisages a secondary constitutional role for judicial review, with this partially 
justified under the conservative account on the grounds that this governing approach 
has been proven to work passably well and therefore should not be lightly displaced. 
But the commitment to this institutional framework, including to a circumscribed role 
for the courts, has not been accompanied (until recently) by the sort of biting critique 
of patterns of judicial decision-making articulated on the left by Griffith,62 where it 
was argued that judges had manipulated the common law to frustrate policies of 
Labour Governments and the pursuit of workplace justice by trade unions.  
 
I have sketched (admittedly with a very broad brush) the contours of a conservative 
tradition of political constitutionalism. Keeping this conservative tradition in mind is 
important since it helps us to appreciate the extent to which political constitutionalism 
is ideologically capacious. That its claims, values and assumptions can be embedded 
within different ideological traditions, and that it is capable of attracting adherents 
from across the ideological divide, is a large part of its appeal as a way of ordering 
constitutional government. Throughout the last century this conservative tradition has 
coexisted with a social democratic variant. In the last twenty years or so, these have 
been joined by liberal and republican variants. The former is associated with Jeremy 
Waldron and the latter with Richard Bellamy and Adam Tomkins. For now, what 
bears emphasis is that each of social democracy and conservatism has served as an 
                                                        
61 Gamble develops this famous analytical framework for understanding conservative politics in the UK in 
Andrew Gamble, The Conservative Nation (Routledge, 1974). See the very useful discussion in Norton (n52). 
62 See e.g. JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana, 1977). 
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ideological ‘bedfellow’63 for political constitutionalism. Within the academic realm, 
the social democratic tradition has tended to obscure its conservative counterpart in 
ways that reflect and reinforce the assumed special affinity between the theory of 
political constitutionalism and the political left. However, it is important for public 
lawyers to recognize that it is the interaction of the two traditions that has buttressed 
political constitutionalism in the UK. Both contributed to forging cross-ideological 
support for its basic institutional commitments of legislative supremacy, responsible 
government and political accountability. Politicians from left and right have largely 
respected the tacit rules and common understandings that sustained throughout much 
of the twentieth century the political culture, and assumptive worlds, presupposed by 
political constitutionalism. With this sketch of the conservative tradition in place, I 
now want to reflect on lessons that are suggested by it about political constitutionalism 
itself.  
 
IV. LESSONS FROM A CONSERVATIVE TRADITION 
 
There are three special lessons to be drawn from a conservative tradition that can help 
us to better understand some ambiguities within political constitutionalism. First, this 
tradition offers a partial response to an important critique of political constitutionalism 
developed by Marco Goldoni over the last seven years. Goldoni suggests that political 
constitutionalism ‘idealises a model of constitutionalism that is locally and historically 
determined’, and which is reliant upon a shared political culture.64 This shared culture 
structures the possibilities of political action, but its impact on the political constitution 
‘is not spelled out and is left unexplored’.65 Political constitutionalists, he argues, lack 
‘an account of the common world which shapes the political constitution’.66 Typically, 
for example, political constitutionalists stress the prevalence of disagreement, and then 
explain why those disagreements are best addressed in legislative arenas, where debate 
is unconstrained by legal technicalities and open to a much wider array of views. But 
political constitutionalists have failed by and large to acknowledge and/or respond to 
the fact that such disagreements are also constrained by the shared culture from which 
political debates emerge.67 The mistake that most political constitutionalists make, for 
                                                        
63 Goldoni and McCorkindale (n31) 2104. 
64 Marco Goldoni, ‘Constitutional Reasoning According to Political Constitutionalism’ (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 1053, 1071. 
65 Goldoni (n64) 1073. 
66 Marco Goldoni (n26) 399. 
67 Goldoni (n26) 403 (‘political action does not take place in a vacuum, nor can it be conceived as totally 
unfettered … there is always a common world from which political action emerges’). 
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Goldoni, is to underestimate the way in which deep-seated structures work to limit the 
transformative potential of ordinary political processes—and most especially in 
respect of any attempts to overhaul those processes or the political regime itself.68 In 
other words, they have paid insufficient attention to the fact that political 
constitutionalism ‘emerges and develops out of a concrete ordering of society’,69 with 
‘layers of material complexity lying at the heart of the political constitution’.70 
 
This is a powerful critique. As I see it, however, it applies more to social democratic 
(and republican and liberal) accounts of political constitutionalism. The conservative 
tradition of political constitutionalism is, in some respects, more in touch with—or at 
the very least, offers a distinct perspective on and way of thinking about—the material 
complexity of the political constitution. It does not shirk away from the ‘historicity’71 
of political constitutionalism. Rather, it conceives of political knowledge, action and 
community in ways that recognize that the subsisting constitutional order is partially 
determined by the past, with this moulding and limiting political and legal behaviour. 
That human reasoning is limited in its capacity to grasp every subtlety of complex 
social practices encourages conservatives to be sensitive to those manners of 
behaviour that, in their view, embody the knowledge accumulated by the polity over 
time. This encourages, in turn, an appreciation of the ways in which the possibilities 
of change are channeled by existing institutional structures and cultural expectations—
and, of course, insofar as this contributes towards a dynamic of constitutional 
continuity that conditions proposals for change, this is something that (unlike Goldoni) 
conservatives generally welcome.  
 
Second, and related to this, thinking about a conservative tradition also helps to draw 
out some ambiguities about the place of and limits on democratic will within political 
constitutionalism. In pointing to the theory’s democratic credentials, with its emphasis 
on majority rule, electoral competition and the mutual respect that flows from hearing 
the other side, some proponents of political constitutionalism have suggested that ‘the 
democratic process is the constitution’.72 This encourages the impression that there is 
an unfettered notion of democracy animating political constitutionalism, glossing over 
                                                        
68 See Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale ‘Why We (Still) Need a Revolution’ (2013) 14 German 
Law Journal 2197. 
69 Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘Political Constitutionalism’ in Mortimer Sellers and Stephan 
Kirste (eds), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Springer, 2017) __, ___. 
70 Marco Goldoni, ‘The Materiality of Political Jurisprudence’ in Michael A. Wilkinson and Michael W. Dowdle 
(eds), Questioning the Foundations of Public Law (Hart, 2018) 165, 170. 
71 Hickford (n24) 586-592. 
72 Bellamy (n4) 5. 
 19 
certain ambiguities about just how democratic a political constitution needs to be; for 
example, in what ways, to what extent, and in what contexts its proponents might be 
prepared in any real world setting to compromise on a strong, citizen-oriented notion 
of democracy in order to secure effective, informed, rational but elite-led deliberation. 
The priority of the various values that animate political constitutionalism (democracy, 
deliberation, accountability, efficiency) needs careful elaboration in specific contexts 
and through time. Keith Ewing has argued, for example, that the late 1890s and early 
1900s was in many respects ‘the high water-mark’ of political constitutionalism in the 
UK, insofar as there then existed a representative government that was responsible to 
an independently-minded but democratically deficient legislature that was not subject 
to the grip of party discipline. Furthermore, to assume that democratic ideals occupy 
an uncomplicated place within political constitutionalism risks concealing the tension 
between, on the one hand, its transformative potential (i.e. every question of law and 
policy, including the framework of the constitution, is open to the possibility of radical 
change by a legally unlimited legislature) and, on the other hand, the political forces 
that temper radical change (i.e. ‘the brutal capacity of the political constitution to 
develop political restraints to contain…any such latent transformative potential’73). 
Different political constitutionalists will (and do) have differing opinions on questions 
such as whether prerogative powers, political parties or unelected second chambers, 
and other seeming institutional lags on the democratic ideal, should form any part of 
a political constitution that adequately instantiates political equality, accountability 
and deliberation. Views will differ as well on the extent to which the elite-centred 
nature of political constitutionalism is itself problematic. The conservative tradition 
sketched above helps to explain why, for some political constitutionalists at least, there 
has been an important and justified place for elite-led deliberation with a political 
constitution that tempers popular will in order to blend continuity and change.74  
 
Third, a conservative tradition can help us to better appreciate the ambiguous place 
that strong government enjoys within political constitutionalist thought. Some public 
lawyers today fail to appreciate that strong government forms an important part of at 
least some interpretations of political constitutionalism. They wrongly assume instead 
that political constitutionalists invariably hold that any executive power that has not 
been statutorily conferred on ministers by a legislature lacks legitimacy, that each and 
every reallocation of power from the executive to the legislature is welcome, and that 
                                                        
73 Ewing (n23) 2117. 
74 See generally Stephen Tierney, ‘Whose Political Constitution? Citizens and Referendums’ (2013) 14 German 
Law Journal 2185. 
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every conceivable way of subordinating the executive to the legislature is desirable.75 
On the one hand, this assumption might seem forgivable, insofar as several prominent 
political constitutionalists over the last twenty years or so have seemed either to almost 
wholly write the executive out of the constitutional picture,76 or to envisage executive 
power in wholly negative terms, focusing exclusively on constraining the executive.77 
On the other hand, thinking about a conservative tradition demonstrates how a strong 
government is consistent with at least some accounts of political constitutionalism.78 
In this tradition, the executive is a vital part of a scheme of good government, fulfilling 
tasks necessary for the public good, including directing the armed forces, managing 
the police, and conducting foreign relations.79 It further recognizes that, in a political 
constitution, the government is responsible. Ministers are accountable to: their party; 
the legislature, where they are subjected to scrutiny by an opposition;80 and ultimately, 
through legislative elections, to the will of the voters. In a political constitution, the 
government is not some democratic anomaly; rather, the government and legislature 
‘share democratic credentials’.81 To my mind, it is deeply regrettable that some have 
airbrushed effective and accountable government out of the political constitutionalist 
picture. It is of course very important to be aware of the potential for a government to 
misuse power, and therefore to ensure that executive power is subject to political 
accountability, to the possibility of change via legislative supremacy, and to the rule 
of law. But it is equally important that accounts of political constitutionalism ‘should 
encompass the role of government in extending liberty and well-being, as well as its 
role in restricting it’.82 
 
                                                        
75 See the cursory dismissal of the connection between strong government and political constitutionalism in: 
Gavin Phillipson, ‘Brexit, Prerogative and the Courts: Why did Political Constitutionalists Support the 
Government Side in Miller?’ (2017) 36 University of Queensland Law Journal 311. 
76 See e.g. Bellamy (n4). 
77 See e.g. Tomkins (n4). 
78 If there were an explicit account of the social democratic tradition of political constitutionalism, it too would 
recognize the importance of strong responsible government in a political constitution, albeit it would differ on 
the rationale for and scope of executive power within a healthy polity, and would stress the government’s role to 
develop, initiate and implement legislation that drives social reform and wealth redistribution. See generally 
Ewing (n15). 
79 For a refreshing defence of executive power, arguing that there is no general reason to strip powers from the 
executive in the UK, see Timothy Endicott, The Stubborn Stain Theory of Executive Power: From Magna Carta 
to Miller (Policy Exchange, 2017). 
80 See Grégoire Webber, ‘Loyal Opposition and the Political Constitution’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 326. 
81 Endicott (n79) 21. 
82 Danny Nicol, ‘Review of Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 280, 
281.  
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V. A ‘NEW’ CONSERVATIVE TRADITION 
 
So far, then, I have sought to correct the relative neglect of the ideological dimensions 
of political constitutionalism by sketching the characteristics of a conservative 
tradition that reflected the dominant constitutional vision of the political right 
throughout most of the last century, and to explain how this tradition can help us to 
better understand political constitutionalism itself. Traditions are not static of course, 
but rather involve ‘the active achievement of continuity’,83 changing in order to remain 
relevant to the communities in which they apply, and in order to continue to attract 
the allegiance of those who choose to participate in them. I now want to suggest that 
the conservative tradition of political constitutionalism has been changing in important 
ways over the last decade, and so much so that it is apt to talk for these purposes, 
albeit in rather un-conservative terms, of a ‘new’ conservative tradition. (I talk of a 
‘new’ tradition mainly for the purposes of exposition; the new conservative tradition 
is very plainly both an inheritance of and extension upon the tradition of political 
constitutionalism outlined earlier in this essay). When Amery, Cecil and Hogg wrote 
about conservatism in the early to mid twentieth century, the social and political 
conditions were still favourable to the flourishing of a political constitution. Today, a 
new conservative tradition seems to be emerging in response to a changing, and less 
favourable, constitutional context. This involves a move away from ‘natural 
conservatism’ (where favourable conditions enabled the participants in the tradition 
merely to enjoy the prevailing arrangements, without having to worry much about the 
prospect of or need for change) to ‘reflective conservatism’ (where participants have 
concluded that something has gone awry with prevailing arrangements that requires 
correction).84  
 
This new tradition encompasses both policy and academic limbs. Its concerns animate 
large sections of the right, including within the Conservative Party, but find expression 
in the writings of a small number of academic public lawyers as well.85 Of note is that 
the academic and policy limbs are also increasingly intertwined, with the centre-right 
think-tank Policy Exchange supplying an institutional focus for much of the policy-
                                                        
83 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd edn, 2001) 37. 
84 Kekes (n37) 7-14. 
85 Some participants would include Richard Ekins, Jason Varhaus and Christopher Forsyth. I would include 
myself as someone working in this new conservative tradition of political constitutionalism, and my analysis 
should plainly be read with that disclosure in mind.  
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oriented work since the creation in 2015 of its Judicial Power Project.86 What unites 
the academic and policy limbs, and distinguishes this new tradition from its precursor, 
is a profound concern with and critique of the rise of judicial power. As participants 
in this new tradition view it, the growth of judicial power over recent decades cannot 
reasonably be denied. People might debate the extent of and reasons for its expansion, 
and also whether it is a good or bad thing, whether in general or in respect of some of 
the specific ways in which the judicial function has expanded. But no one can sensibly 
deny that both the scope and intensity of judicial power, and its reach into domains 
previously the sole province of elected politicians, have increased over fifty years. As 
the new conservative political constitutionalists see it, the changed judicial function is 
a consequence of twin developments: firstly, the dubious decisions of national political 
authorities to confer new powers and responsibilities on domestic courts and to accept 
the jurisdiction of supranational courts; and secondly, changes in the legal culture in 
respect of how many judges, lawyers and academics now seem to regard, among other 
things, the judicial role, human rights, the nation state, and the relationships between 
and priority of law and politics.87 
 
On one reading, conservative concerns about the inflated judicial function might seem 
to be driven by political expediency. According to this critique, it seems convenient 
that conservative political constitutionalists have grown concerned about the exercise 
of judicial power only after courts have become increasingly assertive when reviewing 
executive power and challenging established interests. This critique applies over both 
a longer-term and a shorter-term timeframe. Over a longer arc, it is notable that the 
conservative political constitution tradition exhibited little or no concern with patterns 
of judicial power throughout much of the twentieth century, when the domestic courts 
frustrated the redistributionist policies of left-wing governments or diluted the effect 
of employment legislation promoted by trade unions, and when the Atlee Government 
opposed the creation of the European Court of Human Rights. Over a shorter arc, it is 
notable, that the new conservative critique of judicial power has coincided with a 
period when the Conservative Party has been in government.88 
                                                        
86 For a critique of the Judicial Power Project, see Paul Craig, ‘Judicial Power, the Judicial Power Project and the 
UK’ (2017) 36 University of Queensland Law Journal 355. For a reply, see Ekins and Gee (n5). 
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To my mind, both parts of this critique seem rather ungenerous. It is true that the sort 
of concerns about judicial power so forcefully articulated on the left by the likes of 
Griffith were almost wholly absent on the right throughout much of the last century. 
Politicians and academics on the political right exhibited a comfortable complacency 
towards the judicial function that only began to fray in the 1990s. However, it is also 
true that the tradition of political constitutionalism that in this essay I have traced to 
the conservative thought of politicians such as Amery, Cecil and Hogg took shape at 
a time when domestic courts still occupied a secondary role on the constitutional stage, 
and before the long shadow cast by the Luxembourg Court and Strasbourg Court had 
become clear. As for the new conservative tradition that emerged over the last decade, 
it is scarcely surprising that this should have become prominent during a time when 
the constitution has been in flux, and (on one view) the cumulative consequences of a 
series of changes to the judicial role have become more apparent. It is also important 
to note that several participants in this conservative tradition criticized the exercise of 
judicial power when Labour Governments were in office. It is reasonable, however, 
to note that this new conservative tradition of political constitutionalism has become 
prominent at a time when sizable parts of the Conservative Party seem receptive to its 
critique of the courts.89 At the same time, what is often overlooked is that this new 
conservative tradition criticizes political institutions as well as judicial institutions, 
with both Labour and Conservative politicians criticized for not exercising their 
political responsibility for monitoring the changing contours of judicial power and 
responding when those changes threaten the balance of the constitution.90  
 
This new conservative tradition of political constitutionalism is defined by continuity 
as well as change. For example, it continues to envisage a political constitution that is 
oriented around a strong government able to exercise power for the public good. Part 
of its critique of judicial review is therefore centred on how the courts have crimped 
the legitimate policy-making role of ministers,91 and how decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Human Rights have extended the common law and 
European human rights law in ways that affect the efficacy of the armed forces, by 
                                                        
89 One fairly novel feature of this period of the UK’s political history is the extent of the constitutional fissures 
on the political right, with very real divisions on questions such as European integration, the reform of human 
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90 See e.g.. Ekins and Gee (n5) 390-394. 
91 See e.g. Richard Ekins and Christopher Forsyth, Judging the Public Interest: The Rule of Law vs the Rule of 
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Exchange, 2016). 
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for example reinterpreting the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ to apply to military action 
abroad.92 Similarly, the new conservative tradition continues to believe that a healthy 
political culture remains the most effective safeguard of individual liberty. It thus 
regrets the enactment of the Human Rights Act which has changed the reasoning of 
the domestic courts, which now extends to: how convention rights should be 
understood; whether particular legislative or executive action is a proportionate 
limitation on some general interest; and whether it is possible to read and give effect 
to legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights or whether it should 
be declared out of line. That legislation and executive action is routinely questioned 
in domestic courts, including policies relating to foreign policy and military action, is 
of very grave concern for the new conservative tradition. There are additional changes 
beyond the new critique of the judicial function. Some conservative political 
constitutionalists now recognizes that there is a strong case for occasional use of 
constitutional referendums as a tool for resolving vital questions about the long-term 
identity of the state,93 with such a case especially strong where elite consensus works 
to prevent certain questions that have agitated the public at large from properly 
piercing the mainstream policy agenda.94  
 
There are tensions within this new conservative tradition, especially over what sort of 
and degree of corrective change may be required to restore an appropriate separation 
of judicial and political authority. Some participants within this new tradition seem at 
times to combine both a radical as well as a conservative disposition. For example, 
for some participants, the prospect of leaving the EU involves an assertion of 
democratic self-government that will reaffirm elements of the political constitution, 
and not least by reasserting the primacy of national political authorities and by 
rebalancing some of the relationship between the UK’s national political system and 
a supranational legal regime.95 For the more radical participants within this tradition, 
this rebalancing is only part of the corrective action that is required. The repeal of the 
Human Rights Act and the UK’s withdrawal from the ECHR are the next stages in 
the larger project of restoring balance to the UK’s political constitution. For other 
participants, the new tradition remains imbued with the conservative disposition that 
                                                        
92 See e.g. Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence (2014) EWHC 1369; Al-Skeini v UK (2011) 53 
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cautions against too much reform at any one point in time, especially given the risk 
of mismanaging the constitutional changes involved in a possible exist from the EU. 
Some commentators discern an authoritarian streak within the new conservative 
tradition; or an ‘anarcho-conservatism’ that is dismissive of any institutional 
safeguards on executive power, and which ‘treats established constitutional forms and 
norms as fungible, even disposable, and presses exceptional moments in the direction 
of a central authority delivering the “will of the people”’.96 
 
This new conservative tradition has been the subject of other criticism as well, both 
from those sharing broadly similar concerns about the growth of judicial power as 
well as those who do not. Some political constitutionalists—notably, Richard 
Bellamy—argue that the new conservative tradition bears only superficial similarity 
to the social democratic, republican and liberal accounts of political constitutionalism, 
and that it should not be subsumed within the political constitutionalist school of 
thought.97 This is unconvincing insofar as it overlooks the fact that political 
constitutionalism has long been ideologically promiscuous, with its core commitments 
capable of taking root in a wide variety of ideological traditions, including 
conservatism. Others have bridled at attempts to link this new conservative tradition 
with the constitutional thought of that man of the left, John Griffith.98 Martin Loughlin, 
in particular, objects to attempts to poach Griffith’s arguments for a political 
constitutionalist project that is driven by a very different political orientation, amongst 
other things. Loughlin says that ‘we must acknowledge the nature of manoeuvres 
being made in the reconstructions of Griffith’s arguments’;99 that is to say, the 
refashioning of arguments inspired by Griffith within a very different ideological 
tradition from which he himself inhabited.  
 
For my part, I think that Loughlin is both right and wrong. He is wrong to bridle at 
conservative attempts to draw upon and reconstruct Griffith’s thought, but correct to 
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call for greater explicitness when this is being done. The central claim of my essay is 
that there has long been a conservative tradition of political constitutionalism that for 
much of the twentieth century coexisted alongside a social democratic variant, and 
that over the last ten years or so a new conservative tradition has been emerging. It is 
unsurprising that this new conservative tradition should have been informed by, and 
partially parasitic on, other traditions of political constitutionalism. Traditions ‘do not 
stand independently of each other: they overlap, form parts of each other, and 
problems and questions occurring in one are often resolved in terms of another’.100 It 
is certainly the case that several of those participating in the new conservative tradition 
view themselves as working within an ideologically capacious political 
constitutionalist school of thought, where certain basic institutional commitments 
continue to traverse the left and the right. Griffith’s Chorley Lecture remains an 
important reference point and many of his arguments resonate with conservative 
political constitutionalists, who also see themselves as sharing at least some 
overlapping concerns with republican political constitutionalists such as Bellamy. For 
sure, the intellectual inspirations for the new conservative tradition differs, with more 
stress on the thought of Burke and Oakeshott, and they find support in the work of 
senior judges such as Lords Sumption and Sales, some of whose judgments will rankle 
political constitutionalists from other ends of the ideological spectrum. And some of 
the substantive contexts in which the conservative critique of the courts comes to the 
fore—such as national security cases, and especially those involving the armed 
forces—may not attract much sympathy from some others who self-identify as 
political constitutionalists. But at least until recently, there was a basic continuing 
coherence between the different interpretations of political constitutionalism. There 
are signs that this might be changing, as I briefly suggest in the next section. 
 
VI. THE BIFURCATION OF POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
 
I have suggested, then, that political constitutionalism is ideologically capacious, with 
its main claims, values and assumptions finding expression in a number of ideological 
traditions—including social democracy, liberalism, republicanism and conservatism. 
Despite its ideological capaciousness, there has—until recently—been a relatively high 
degree of coherence within and between the different ideological threads to political 
constitutionalism. For sure, there have been differences in emphasis, as was illustrated 
by the sketch of the conservative tradition emblematic of the constitutional thought of 
the right during the twentieth century. Yet, from across the different ideological 
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traditions, the proponents of political constitutionalism have coalesced around a 
similar institutional framework (i.e. a representative democracy organized around 
legislative supremacy and responsible government, and which is defined by its reliance 
upon mechanisms of political accountability); a similar set of constitutional values 
(e.g. political equality and self-government); and largely similar assumptions (e.g. 
about the proper relationship between law and politics). It is this coherence that for a 
long time concealed the range of ideological traditions within which political 
constitutionalism can take root. I now want to suggest that there are signs that this 
coherence is under strain, and that political constitutionalism may be bifurcating along 
ideological lines. 
 
The new conservative tradition of political constitutionalism associated with the right 
that has emerged over the last ten years or so can be contrasted with a radical, nascent 
understanding of political constitutionalism expounded by a new cohort of left-leaning 
academics, such as Marco Goldoni, Michael Gordon and Christopher McCorkindale. 
Animating this new radical understanding is a concern to identify and address the 
forces that frustrate the political system’s capacity for transformative change. Whereas 
conservatives might view at least some of those forces as furnishing continuity and 
stability, this cohort of political constitutionalists seem suspicious of how those forces 
marginalize and exclude certain voices from the political arena. Although sympathetic 
to and basically supportive of the basic institutional frame of a political constitution, 
these political constitutionalists search for new sites of political activity that can 
disrupt the status quo. They seek to illuminate the ‘deeply engrained form of 
entrenchment’101 that, as they see it, results from the party system, electoral law, 
campaign finance rules and so forth. Their concerns extend to the pathologies of 
parliamentary government, such as the sometime failure of legislatures to hold the 
government to account, and the risk that political representation inside legislatures is 
all too often inadequate or unequal.102 Moved in these ways by some of the 
shortcomings of political processes, they question some of the seeming fundamentals 
of political constitutionalism, such as whether it must be premised on a model of 
representative democracy, and ask instead whether there is a need to experiment with 
new institutional forms, such as citizens juries. Some have even questioned several 
shibboleths of political constitutionalism, with Goldoni going so far as to argue that 
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in some circumstances higher order law and strong judicial protection of constitutional 
rights might be appropriate.103  
 
Or to put this differently: if the multiple ideological traditions that comprised political 
constitutionalist project tended to exhibit a basic unity, this may be changing, and we 
may be witnessing the bifurcation of political constitutionalism into two less coherent 
and less unified traditions: a new conservative tradition associated with the right and 
a new radical variant associated with the left. The conservative tradition—for better 
or worse—hews quite closely to political constitutionalism as we have known it, while 
the radical variant seeks to re-imagine the institutional form of political 
constitutionalism and to interrogate the political and social forces that have shaped it. 
If we are indeed observing the bifurcation of political constitutionalism, is this to be 
welcomed? On the one hand, this may be a harbinger of the waning of the ideological 
consensus that has (until recently) sustained cross-party support in the UK for the 
political constitution. It might be that a growing gulf between different ideological 
traditions within political constitutionalism speaks to a loss of faith by at some of its 
adherents in its basic claims, values and assumptions. More than this, it could be 
suggested that this is symptomatic of an ‘epistemological crisis’104 brewing within the 
political constitutionalist project, where its proponents are slowly coming to terms 
with the limits on using this theory to understand the UK’s unsettled constitution. 
Indeed, parts of the ‘internal critique’105 of political constitutionalism offered by 
Goldoni might lead some to wonder whether he has argued himself out of the political 
constitutionalist project altogether. It may be that, in the face of a possible 
epistemological crisis, Goldoni seeks ‘the invention or discovery of new concepts and 
the framing of some new type or types of theory’ that is in ‘no way derivable from 
those earlier positions’106 that have been so characteristic of political constitutionalism. 
On the other hand, a better reading, as I see it, is that the disaggregation of the various 
ideological traditions within political constitutionalism is overdue, and that this is a 
welcome chance to flush out the tensions and limitations secreted within much of the 
political constitutionalist scholarship to date. It may be that the bifurcation of political 
constitutionalism into better-defined and more distinct traditions can cultivate a more 
self-reflexive debate between its proponents that, in turn, renders explicit the renewed 
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In recent years political constitutionalists have sought to render explicit the political 
conditions and social forces that are necessary for a political constitution to flourish 
in a real world polity. However, largely absent from this ‘reflexive’ wave has been 
much attempt to explore how different ideological traditions help or hinder the 
development of political constitutionalism. This is regrettable: the ideological 
dimensions to political constitutionalism matter. They matter insofar as cross-party 
ideological consensus is vital if a political constitution is to endure the whirlwind of 
competitive party politics within a constitutional order defined by the lack of 
justiciable limits on the legislature. In this essay I have begun to remedy the neglect 
of these ideological dimensions by charting a changing conservative tradition of 
political constitutionalism that helps to explain this theory’s connection with and 
appeal to large sections of the right in the UK over the last century or so. I have 
explained how this conservative tradition has acquired a heightened prominence and 
slightly different character over the last ten or so years, defined as it now is by sharp 
critiques of the expanded role of domestic and supranational courts as well as the 
decisions of national political authorities that have enabled this. A possible bifurcation 
within political constitutionalism may be emerging between a conservative tradition 
associated with the political right on the one hand and a more radical variant associated 
with the political left on the other. If correct, this suggests that the various ideological 
dimensions to political constitutionalism are only going to grow in importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
